Do Amnesty Programs Encourage Illegal Immigration? Evidence from IRCA
At the time of its passage in 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) marked the biggest change in U.S. immigration policy in decades. IRCA granted amnesty to undocumented immigrants who met specific provisions, required employers to verify workers' eligibility to work legally, and increased funding for the Border Patrol. Over 3 million individuals, including 2.3 million Mexicans, were granted legal permanent resident status under IRCA. Opponents of the law claimed that it would encourage future illegal immigration, notwithstanding tougher border enforcement, because it set a precedent for granting amnesty (e.g., Anderson, 1986) .
1 Such concerns arose again recently as, fifteen years later, another amnesty is under consideration. President George W. Bush is considering granting legal residency to some of the estimated 3 to 4 million undocumented Mexican immigrants currently present in the United States, a proposal strongly endorsed by Mexican President Vicente Fox.
Previous research on the effect of IRCA on flows of undocumented immigrants has reached mixed conclusions. Based on data gathered from seven Mexican communities in 1987-89, Donato, Durand and Massey (1992b) find little evidence that IRCA lowered the number of undocumented Mexicans entering the United States. Based on estimates from decennial Census and Current Population Survey data after correcting for changes in the size of the undocumented immigrant population as a result of IRCA, Woodrow and Passell (1990) similarly conclude that the annual change in the number of undocumented immigrants during 1986-88 was not significantly different from changes prior to IRCA. Bean et al. (1990) , in contrast, conclude from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data on apprehensions during 1977-89 that apprehensions declined by about 27 percent after IRCA; the effect did not change significantly during the 35-month post-IRCA period they observe. White, Bean and Espenshade (1990) report a similar result using INS apprehensions data for 1977-88.
This study reexamines the effect of IRCA on undocumented immigration flows to the United States. Unlike previous studies, we distinguish between the period immediately following passage of the bill and the period when amnesty applications were accepted as well as assessing the overall effect of IRCA on illegal immigrant flows through 1996. Because the main IRCA legalization program required that applicants be present in the United States, the law may have encouraged illegal immigration immediately following its passage or during the application period but not after the amnesty program expired. Expected tougher border enforcement in the future also may have prompted undocumented immigration shortly after the law was enacted. In addition, IRCA may have encouraged immigration even after the amnesty period expired if the law fostered beliefs that other amnesty programs would occur in the future. Alternatively, the long run effects of IRCA may differ from the short term effects as potential migrants learned whether employment eligibility documentation requirements could easily be circumvented.
Establishing the effect of an amnesty program on unauthorized immigration is important for several reasons. First, the number of illegal immigrants present in the United States is
substantial. An estimated 7 to 8.5 million immigrants-including 3.9 to 4.5 million Mexicanswere illegally present in the United States in 2000, and the annual net flow of undocumented immigrants is estimated at 275,000 (Porter, 2001; Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000) . It is generally believed that undocumented immigrants have lower skill levels, on average, than other immigrants (Fix and Passel, 1994; Tienda and Singer, 1995) ; this is partly because most undocumented immigrants are from Mexico and, more recently, other Latin American countries, which have low average levels of education. The negative effects of immigration on natives' labor market outcomes are generally believed to be concentrated among high school dropouts, so an additional influx of low-skilled immigrants could have adverse effects on some natives (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997) . 2 Larger flows of low-skilled immigrants may also exacerbate income inequality and impose fiscal burdens on state and local governments (Smith and Edmonston, 1997) .
The next section details the provisions of IRCA. We then discuss the data and methods used to examine whether the Act encouraged undocumented immigration. The results indicate that the flow of undocumented immigrants slowed for six months after passage of IRCA but then returned to previous levels. We do not find that IRCA stimulated illegal immigration in the hopes of receiving amnesty, but we also do not find that the law discouraged undocumented migration in the long run. A substantial number of applications for the IRCA amnesty program are believed to have been fraudulent. For example, the entire qualifying foreign-born labor force, both legal and illegal, believed to meet the SAW provisions was estimated at about 300,000, far less than the more than 1 million SAW applications granted (Passel, 1999) . Based on surveys conducted in Mexico, Donato and Carter (1999) estimate that, in their samples, 73 percent of LAW applications were fraudulent, and 40 percent of SAW applications. Cornelius (1989) The act also allowed persons who had resided illegally and continuously in the United States.
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since January 1, 1972, to immediately qualify for LPR status. 
Data
We use INS data on the number of apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border as a proxy for illegal immigration inflows. 4 The number of apprehensions is, of course, not an ideal measure of the number of illegal migrants successfully entering the United States or even of the 3 Several studies conclude that IRCA had negative effects on employment outcomes of undocumented immigrants (Bansak and Raphael, 2001; Donato, Durand and Massey, 1992a; Donato and Massey, 1993) . However, research has not been able to distinguish whether such negative effects are due to a decline in demand or an increase in supply of undocumented immigrants. 4 The INS data on apprehensions and enforcement are "linewatch," or activities at the U.S. border instead of in the interior. As discussed by However, as noted by Bean et al. (1990) , INS apprehensions data are believed to be correlated with illegal crossings and are useful for examining periodic changes in the number of such crossings. Espenshade (1995) Table 1 indicate that there was an average of 58,000 apprehensions per month during the pre-filing period, compared with almost 60,000 per month during the 12-month filing period for amnesty.
Border Patrol man-hours spent enforcing the border also generally rose over time.
Enforcement hours rose during the IRCA pre-filing period but declined during the filing period and immediately afterward until rising again in March 1988. Average monthly enforcement hours declined from 237,000 during the pre-filing period to about 203,000 during the filing period (Table 1) .
Economic conditions in both the United States and Mexico are likely to affect the number of persons attempting to cross the border. 5 For the United States, the empirical model below includes measures of the real average wage, the real federal minimum wage, and the average unemployment rate. 6 We deflate wages by the consumer price index (CPI) for urban consumers. 5 We do not include measures of economic conditions in other countries of origins because Mexicans account for the vast majority of apprehensions, although the share of non-Mexicans apprehended at the border has increased over time. Mexicans accounted for 96.1 percent of apprehensions during 1988-94 . 6 The U.S. wage is a weighted average of hourly earnings for production workers in eight industries (mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation and public utilities, finance/insurance/real estate, and services). The weights are based on the industry distribution of Mexican-born men aged 15-64 in the For Mexico, we include the real average manufacturing wage and the minimum wage, which are deflated using the Mexican CPI; we do not include a measure of the Mexican unemployment rate because reliable data are not available during the early part of the sample period. 7 Because of the importance of oil production to Mexico's economy, we include the U.S. producer price index for crude oil to capture changes in oil prices. We also include the real exchange rate between
Mexico and the United States, deflated using the CPI for both countries.
The number of visas issued is another factor that may influence the inflow of illegal 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 decennial Censuses who immigrated in the last five years and do not report being a citizen (except for 1960, when citizenship was not asked). 7 In some years the Mexican manufacturing wage data include a December bonus of up to two or three times monthly earnings (aguinaldo). We removed this bonus from the data by subtracting the average difference in December wages between years with the bonus and years without the bonus from observations in years with the bonus.
Methods
We regress border apprehensions on border enforcement, the measures of economic Because the apprehensions data display very high first-order serial correlation, we estimate the regressions in first differences, a method that is robust to the presence of a unit root in the disturbance term. All of the continuous variables are in log first differences (the fiscal year variables are in log 12-month differences), and the regressions also include a linear time trend and set of month dummy variables to control for the seasonal pattern of apprehensions.
We report both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) results. The IV regressions instrument for border enforcement, which is endogenous if increased flows of illegal immigrants cause stepped-up border enforcement within the same month or if both border crossings and enforcement respond to another factor not controlled for in the model. We instrument for border enforcement with U.S. government expenditures on defense and with three lags of border enforcement.
Results
Apprehensions clearly declined during the period immediately after IRCA was passed but before the amnesty application filing period began. As Table 2 indicates, apprehensions were about 11 percent lower during the pre-filing period than prior to IRCA's passage, controlling for other factors. Apprehensions during the filing period and thereafter were not significantly different than before IRCA, according to the results. In results not shown here, we included separate linear time trends for the pre-and post-IRCA periods. The estimated coefficients for the trend variables were not significantly different, also indicating that IRCA did not substantially affect illegal immigrant inflows.
Enforcement is positively associated with apprehensions in both the OLS and IV results, with a 10 percent increase in enforcement associated with a 4.4 percent increase in apprehensions in the OLS specification reported in column 1. As shown in Column 2, the estimated magnitude increases with enforcement is instrumented with defense spending and lagged enforcement; this result is surprising since endogeneity would be expected to bias the estimated coefficient on the enforcement variable upward. also find that the magnitude of the enforcement coefficient increases slightly when the variable is instrumented.
Apprehensions decline when the real average manufacturing wage in Mexico rises, with a 10 percent increase in the wage lowering apprehensions by about 3.3 percent. This indicates that improved economic conditions in Mexico reduce migration flows to the United States, a result also reported by many other immigration studies. The real exchange rate is positively associated with apprehensions at the 10 percent significance level, suggesting that more Mexicans illegally migrate to the United States when the purchasing power of their dollar earnings rises in Mexico.
We do not find significant relationships between apprehensions and measures of economic conditions in the United States, suggesting that "push" factors may play more of a role than "pull" factors in undocumented Mexican immigration. INS admissions of LPRs or nonimmigrants do not appear to influence apprehensions.
The results in Table 2 are based on the period 1969-96. Previous studies examining the effect of IRCA on apprehensions used a shorter time period, beginning in 1977 and ending in either 1988 or 1989 White, Bean and Espenshade, 1990) . Table 3 shows the results if our sample is restricted to January 1977 through December 1989. The post-IRCA variable then is equal to one for the period May 1988 through December 1989 instead of, as in Table 2 , through December 1996. The results again indicate that apprehensions declined immediately after IRCA's passage but then returned to normal levels during the filing period and thereafter. Previous studies that did not distinguish between the different phases of the IRCA amnesty program but instead looked for differences at 12-month intervals found a negative effect for the entire period after IRCA's passage, whereas our results indicate that the negative effect occurred only during the six months after the law was passed.
The above results do not indicate that apprehensions increased during the main IRCA 
Conclusion
This study examined the effect of IRCA on undocumented immigration flows using data on border apprehensions, a proxy for the number of people illegally entering the United States.
Apprehensions declined immediately after passage of IRCA but then returned to normal levels during the amnesty filing period and thereafter. These results have several implications. Since we find that apprehensions did not rise during the filing period, as would be expected if people migrated to the United States to fraudulently apply for the program, it appears that amnesty programs do not encourage illegal immigration. If anything, IRCA reduced the number of illegal immigrants in the short run, perhaps because potential migrants thought that it would be more difficult to cross the border or to get a job in the United States after the law was passed. An amnesty program also does not appear to encourage illegal immigration in the long run in the hopes of another amnesty program; we do not find a significant difference between apprehensions after the IRCA amnesty program expired and before the program was created.
However, IRCA does not appear to have discouraged illegal immigration in the long run.
The INS apprehensions data used here do not allow us to distinguish between new and returning illegal immigrants or to estimate the stock of illegal immigrants in the United States.
Our findings suggest that the net change in the stock of illegal immigrants was not affected by IRCA in the long run. However, the net change in the stock of illegal immigrants could have increased if illegal immigrants already present perceived that it was more difficult to cross the border after the law was passed. Circular migration between the United States and Mexico could have slowed, leading to a reduction in apprehensions of illegal immigrants who usually reside in the United States but temporarily returned to Mexico to visit relatives and had to illegally recross the border. A decline in apprehensions due to reduced circular migration could offset an increase in apprehensions among new illegal immigrants, suggesting that the illegal immigrant population could have risen. Future research should examine this possibility using individual-level data on border crossing patterns among both repeat and first-time illegal migrants. 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
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